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I. INTRODUCTION
Advocates of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) disagree about
many things, but they are virtually unanimous that the litigation system
is in serious need of reform. It is too slow, too expensive, too cumbersome,
too lawyer-dominated, too inaccessible, too mystified, and too regimented.
Alternative dispute resolution, particularly as typified by mediation,
promises to be more efficient, more humane, more empowering, and
more creative. To be sure, conventional dispute resolution has its de-
fenders,' but no participant or observer of the judicial system can deny
that efficiency, humanity, empowerment, and creativity are qualities
that are in notably short supply in most American courtrooms.
Like solar power or gasohol, alternative dispute resolution is simply
too good an idea to pass up. It is a concept that demands fair exper-
imentation. If mediation can deliver even a fraction of its perceived
potential, it is an idea whose time has arrived. Moreover, it is an idea
with relatively little negative potential. Since mediated solutions are
voluntary by definition, the principal risk in experimenting with mediation
is some amount of wasted time and energy. Measured against the
possibility of streamlining and improving the resolution system, that is
very little risk indeed.
To date, much of the experimentation with ADR has been private
in nature. Private, not-for-profit neighborhood justice centers have been
established in a number of cities; they deal primarily with small claims
and personal disputes, which are often referred by local municipal courts.
At the other end of the disputing spectrum, large institutions have
experimented with purportedly cost efficient methods such as mini-trials
and rent-a-judge programs. What unifies these disparate approaches to
ADR is that they all depend upon party initiative. Mini-trials do not
happen, and judges are not rented, unless the litigants agree between
themselves to attempt alternative dispute resolution. Even in the case
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of referrals from small claims courts, mediation does not occur unless
the parties willingly participate-and that usually requires that they
make and keep appointments at a Neighborhood Justice Center or
similar outpost.' As important as these experiments are, they ultimately
tell us very little about the potential for ADR to displace some significant
portion of in-court litigation.
The State of Florida, however, has recently undertaken a far bolder
experiment. In 1987, the Florida legislature enacted the nation's most
comprehensive ADR statute.' The Florida act defines mediation and,
with certain exceptions, provides that courts may refer all or any part
of a contested lawsuit to mandatory mediation.' At least in theory, the
entire Florida civil justice system has established ADR as an ordinary
and available aspect of the pretrial process.
II. MEDIATION IN A JUDICIAL ENVIRONMENT
I became aware of the Florida experiment when I was invited to
participate in a workshop in Tallahassee, Florida entitled "Mediation
in a Judicial Environment." Jointly sponsored by The Florida State
University Center for Dispute Resolution and the National Institute for
Dispute Resolution, the purposes of the workshop were at once both
local and global in scope. On a purely local level, the program was
convened to discuss and brainstorm forms of implementation of the
sweeping new mediation statute. More broadly, the conferees were asked
to reflect upon the future of the mediation movement, particularly as
it will be affected by the advent of court-annexed programs.
The attendees were chosen for their diverse backgrounds; they in-
cluded mediators, lawyers, court administrators, judges, professors, and
others. My assignment was to provide an evaluative analysis. As a
nonmediator, nonplayer in the ADR world, I was asked to observe the
proceedings, comment upon the various proposals, and provide assistance
in unpacking the inevitable assumptions.
In the course of observing the workshop, it became apparent to me
that the local and global aspects of the discussion were inseparable.
The Florida Mediation Act is far from self-implementing, and it will
require the effort, assistance, and understanding of the nation's trained
mediators if it is to achieve any measure of practical success. Conversely,
mediation professionals, or at least those who wish to enter the main-
2. Regarding the potential for subtle or overt coercion in these circumstances, see
Delgado, Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359.
3. FLA. STAT. § 44.301-306 (1987). Comparable statutes have been enacted in other
states. See TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 20.
4. FLA. STAT. § 44.301-302 (1987).
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stream, must recognize that Florida's statutory approach may well
presage the future of alternative dispute resolution.
The current literature on mediation and ADR essentially stresses the
virtue and mechanics of alternative resolution.' Although much has been
said about the use of mediation as an alternative to litigation, relatively
little has been written about the actual incorporation of ADR as a
required procedural aspect of the civil justice system.6 The Florida State
University workshop, however, was presented with precisely that question.
Because the conferees included many of the nation's most prominent
ADR proponents and activists, their approach to mandatory mediation
will be extremely instructive on the future of court-annexed alternative
dispute resolution. What front-line mediators have to say about man-
datory mediation will tell us much about whether alternative dispute
resolution will be able to cope with institutionalized success.
It is most notable, then, that the workshop was characterized by
what might be called a mediator-centric point of view. While the topic
of mediation in a judicial setting would seem to call for at least roughly
equal treatment of the problems or concerns of mediators and adjudi-
cators (not to mention advocates and parties), most of the actual
discussion revolved around the mediator/mediation side of the equation.
This was remarkable for several reasons, not the least of which was the
presence at the workshop of many judges and lawyers. Nonetheless,
their concerns tended to be given less attention, perhaps because the
attending mediators were viewed as the relevant experts. 7
Mediator-centrism does not characterize every aspect of the workshop,
but it was definitely a dominant theme that recurred in a variety of
5. See, e.g., R skin, The Special Place of Mediation in Alternative Dispute Processing,
37 U. FLA. L. REV. 19 (1985); Lieberman & Henry, Lessons from the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Movement, 53 U. CH. L. REV. 424 (1986); Edwards, Alternative Dispute
Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668 (1986); Menkel-Meadow,
Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA
L. REV. 754 (1984); Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV.
305 (1971).
6. See Pearson, An Evaluation of Alternatives to Court Adjudication, 7 JuST. Sys.
J. 420, 426-27 (1982) (statistics on the voluntary and coercive use of mediation show
much higher use of mediation when it is mandatory); Silberman & Schepard, Court-
Ordered Mediation in Family Disputes: The New York Proposal, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 741, 746 (1986) (court-ordered mediation may be helpful in convincing
initially resistent parties that compromises and cooperation are useful in resolving differ-
ences); Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory
Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485 (1985); Bush, Dispute Resolution Alter-
natives and the Goals of Civil Justice: Jurisdictional Principles for Process Choice, 1984
Wis. L. REV. 893.
7. The deference given to the expertise of mediators was interesting, if not ironic,
given the emphasis that the ADR movement often places on demystifying and de-expertising
the world of disputing. See, e.g., Greason, Humanists as Mediators: An Experiment in
the Courts of Maine, 66 A.B.A. J. 576 (1980) (discussing the informal and humanistic
approach to ADR used by the courts in Maine).
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contexts. I will organize the balance of this paper around two basic
concepts essential to court-annexed mediation, integrating my own views
with what I perceived to be the regnant ideas of the workshop attendees.
First, I will discuss the problem of case suitability and selection, and
then I will turn to the issue of mediator training and qualifications.
While these topics do not at all exhaust the issues inherent in mandatory
mediation, they do provide a useful and substantial context within which
to examine many of the problems facing institutionalized alternative
dispute resolution.
III. CASE SUITABILITY AND SELECTION
The Florida mediation statute allows trial court judges to refer
virtually any civil matter to mediation, with only slight exceptions. Apart
from defining "mediation" in vague terms, the statute is otherwise
maddeningly imprecise. It neither requires that all qualifying cases be
referred, nor does it provide guidelines for referral. Instead, that task
is left to the chief judges of the various judicial circuits. Thus, from
the point of view of judges, litigants, and lawyers, a crucial question
for analysis at the workshop should have been "which cases will go to
mediation?" But this subject essentially received only interstitial atten-
tion. Indeed, even the short presentations that were officially devoted
to "judicial standards" discussed case selection only in passing.
In many ways, however, case selection is the primary issue confronting
court-annexed mediation. It is virtually impossible to address any other
relevant query without knowing which cases will be sent to mediation,
or at least what standards will be used to decide this. Will only small
cases be mediated or only large ones? Will mediation apply to multi-
party cases as well as to two party disputes? How will matters involving
institutional litigants be handled? Will the courts do their sorting ac-
cording to case classification, or will attention be paid to individual
case characteristics?8
The above are only some of the "pure" selection questions. There
are related "process" questions as well: How will courts handle remittal
of mediation? May a single party peremptorily veto referral to mediation?
8. These issues have received some attention in the literature, although not always
in the context of court-annexation. See, e.g., Bush, supra note 6, at 893 (past analyses
have resolved the case-type question with one-step reasoning, Le., where parties have a
close and ongoing relationship, mediation should be used. Bush suggests a complex model
for determining which case type for which resolution process); Schepard, Taking Children
Seriously: Promoting Cooperative Custody After Divorce, 64 TEx. L. REV. 687, 777
(1985); McEwen & Maiman, Small Claims Mediation in Maine: An Empirical Assessment,
33 ME. L. REv. 237 (1981); D. PROVINE, SETTLEMENT STRATEGIES FOR FEDERAL
DISTRICT JUDGES (1986); Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Res-
olution, 62 TUL. L. Rev. 1 (1987).
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May the parties avoid mediation by unanimous consent? Alternatively,
must one or more of the parties show "good cause" to avoid referral?
What would "good cause" mean? What does compliance with referral
entail? Is simple presence at a single session sufficient, or is meaningful
participation required?
As a "designated outsider" to the mediation movement, I am singularly
unable to answer these questions. More to the point, most judges and
court administrators obviously labor under the same disability. By ad-
dressing these issues of central concern to the judicial system, mediation
mavens would make a tremendous contribution. The following sections
discuss my own views, suppositions, and questions regarding case selection.
A. The Need for Case Classification
The Florida mediation statute provides only that "a court may refer
all or any portion of a contested civil action ... to mediation."9 The
statute is permissive, and it contains no guidelines to govern the referral
of cases. The legislative intent appears to be to make mediation available,
but not to require it in every case. 10 The statute does require the Florida
Supreme Court to adopt rules of implementation."
Pursuant to this legislative authority, the Florida Supreme Court has
adopted interim rules that govern various aspects of court-annexed
mediation. 2 The rules contain only one provision concerning case selec-
tion, and that deals with exclusions from mediation. 3 No comparable
provision exists governing the exercise of discretion to refer, although
the rule does allow the chief judge in each circuit additionally to exclude
from mediation "such other matters as may be specified ... ,
This regime can only create a quandary for trial judges. They may
(but need not) refer most (but not all) civil cases to mediation. Chief
judges may preemptively exclude "other matters" from mediation, but
the rule does not state whether this is to be done on a categorical or
individual basis. Furthermore, apart from the designated exclusions, it
appears from the rules that judicial referral makes mediation mandatory;
mediation may be excused only upon motion," with sanctions available
9. FLA. STAT. § 44.302(1) (1987).
10. Id. This is apparent from the language "all or any portion," which obviously gives
a court some measure of discretion.
11. FLA. STAT. § 44.306 (1987).
12. In re: Proposed Rules for Implementation of Florida Statutes Sections 44.301-
.306, 518 So. 2d 908 (1987) (effective Jan. 1, 1988).
13. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.710(b) (excluding a limited category of claims from mediation
"except upon petition of all parties").
14. Id. at 1.710(b)(8).
15. "[T]he presiding judge may refer any contested civil matter or selected issues for
assignment to mediation ...." Id. at 1.700(a).
16. Id. at 1.700(c).
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for noncompliance. 17 Since the statute provides no mechanism for actually
funding mediation programs, it recognizes that mediation may be a
scarce resource that is not available in every case where it might be
desirable. 8
Thus, the decision to refer is necessarily a complex and important
one. What cases are most appropriate for mediation? The following
sections discuss two possible bases for referral: classification by case
type and classification by case characteristics.
B. Referral by Case Types
Reference to case type provides the easiest resolution of the referral
problem. Cases may be classified in a variety of ways, each of which
results in a bright-line rule. Certainly, from the point of view of judicial
efficiency, it makes the most sense for referral to mediation to be as
nearly ministerial as possible. 9
For example, a court might adopt a rule that refers cases on the
basis of the underlying cause of action, such as torts or contracts.
Similarly, referral might run according to subject matter or size of
claim. Chief judges could adapt these or any number of other bright-
line rules for circuit wide application, or individual judges could utilize
them as selection devices. In fact, given the characteristic judicial
emphasis on efficiency, it is entirely likely that the process of selection
will fall by default into a rule of thumb procedure. That being the case,
it would be extremely useful for mediation professionals to address the
case type question.
It appears from the Florida Supreme Court's Interim Rules that
mediation is at least contemplated for cases of all sizes. Special pro-
cedures are set forth for the mediation of small claims,' and separate
sets of "Mediator Qualifications" are given for the lower civil court
and the court of general jurisdiction.2' Regarding subject matter and
causes of action, however, only "family and dissolution of marriage"
cases are specifically mentioned in the rules.'
One may extrapolate, therefore, that in the supreme court's judgment,
domestic relations cases (given the appropriate mediator) are particularly
suited to mediation. This, however, is a matter of some controversy.
Several attorneys and women's advocates at the Florida workshop ques-
tioned the value of mediation in family matters. A frequent criticism
of mediation is that the process may tend to perpetuate power imbalances
17. Id. at 1.720(b).
18. See FLA. STAT. § 44.302(1) (1987).
19. See Bush, supra note 6, at 942-62.
20. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.750.
21. Id. at 1.760(a) and (c).
22. Id. at 1.760(b).
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that might be more amenable to rectification in court.23 In the family
law setting, women might feel more acutely pressured to resolve dif-
ferences informally, rather than to insist on an adjudication of rights.
Finally, the spectre of domestic violence may, with or without the
knowledge of the mediator, skew the process. 24
On the other hand, it is possible that family matters are the ideal
subject for across-the-board mediation: the parties are involved in a
continuing relationship. The needs of children may be more important
than adherence to legal norms. Emotional considerations may predom-
inate over financial ones. Finally, adversarial behavior might doom a
potentially "successful" divorce. 25
These issues were discussed at the workshop only in the contexts of
mediator training and the purpose (efficiency versus quality) of media-
tion. Should family mediators have to have degrees in social work?
Should the ranks of family mediators be closed to lawyers?26 Should
family mediators be concerned with justice, or only with agreement?27
In other words, the question of family mediation was mediator-centric.
But the investigation should be deeper than that. In a system of court-
compelled participation, judges need to know whether family matters,
viewed as a case type, should be routinely, sparingly, or never referred.
Because the supreme court rule seems to imply automatic mediation,
a court-centered approach at the workshop-augmenting academic dis-
cussion with actual experience-was necessary either to validate or
invalidate that assumption.
The same can be said of other case types as well. Even in the absence
of mention in the interim rules, judges may be prone to refer all contract
cases to mediation (because they involve relationships) or not to refer
any tort cases (because they involve single events).2 The reverse might
23. Delgado, supra note 2, at 1359; Rifkin, Mediation from a Feminist Perspective:
Promise and Problem, 2 LAW & INEQUALITY 21 (1984).
24. See Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal
Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57, 61 (1984) (maintaining that
mediation is not a desirable remedy for abuse cases).
25. See Silberman & Schepard, supra note 6, at 746-47 (stating that court-ordered
mediation programs should encourage settlement of family disputes).
26. Cf. J. FOLBERG, DIVORCE MEDIATION-PROMISES AND PROBLEMS, (cited in S.
GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION 315 (1978)) (asserting that
because family mediation crosses traditional professional boundaries these are questions
about interdisciplinary cooperation and struggles for turf).
27. Cf. id. at 317 (stating that to insure fairness, current mediation practice is to
urge or require that each divorcing party seek independent legal counsel to review the
proposed agreement).
28. The pro-ADR literature generally stresses the importance of preserving relationships
and structuring long-term solutions. Hence, single-event disputes may be seen as less
amenable to mediation. See S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION
92 (1978) (indicating that the process of mediation is said to improve the parties' capacity
to resolve their future disputes); Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29,
33 (1982) (mediation can help in creating, operating, or dissolving contract relationships).
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also be true, and it is most likely that different judges will adopt
different rules of thumb. Moreover, individual judges' referral standards
probably will not be explicit; in the absence of clear rules or directives,
they will more likely take the form of unarticulated inclinations.
All of this brings us back to the principal question: are some sorts
of civil cases better suited to mediation than others? Only mediators
have the answer, but judges are vitally in need of the information. If
referrals ought to be made according to case type, then judges need
specific guidance. If there is no basis for making subject matter referral,
then judges need to be dissuaded from taking that route. In either case,
the mediator-centered focus of the Florida workshop prevented the
precise question from being addressed.
C. Referral By Case Characteristics
An alternative approach to across the board referrals would be
consideration of individual cases. Are there identifiable characteristics
that make certain cases more or less mediatable? Is it possible to create
a checklist of factors for use by referring judges? Again, information
along this line can only come from mediation professionals, and it is
reasonable to assume that there exists some accumulated wisdom-even
if it is only anecdotal-as to what makes a dispute amenable to mediation.
I noticed at the Florida State workshop that mediators often traded
this sort of information informally among themselves, but there was no
attempt to organize the material into a format that could be used by
referring judges.
Of course, the project of creating a taxonomy of mediatability is
daunting. It may be beyond the competence of any single group of
conferees, and the concept is no doubt controversial within the field of
mediation itself.9 Still, it seems intuitively preferable that judges pay
some attention to the individual aspects of cases in making discretionary
referrals. To do this they will need some guidance.
Perhaps lawsuits can be categorized according to their outcome
potential. In the field of negotiation, it is recognized that some disputes
are distributional while others are integrative .3 That is, in some disputes
there is a single sum to be divided between, or a single figure to be
29. See Brunet, supra note 8 (suggesting a two-tier process for judicial review); see
also Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudicative Services and
the Need for a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1808 (1986);
Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837 (1984).
30. H. RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 33 (1982); see R. FISHER
& W. URY, GETTING TO YEs: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 72-83
(1981); see also S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F, SANDER, supra note 28, at 19-21 (discussing
the contentions of Raiffa and of Fisher and Ury).
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determined by, the parties. These are zero-sum cases; what one party
gains the other loses, and the style of bargaining involved is often termed
purely distributional. Other disputes, however, hold the potential for
more creative, win-win solutions. It may be possible for the parties to
engage in a nondistributional process of value creation whereby all
positions can be enhanced.31
In the world of lawsuits the relationship between the parties may
determine the nature of the bargaining that takes place. Single-incident
personal injury cases are usually regarded as lying on the distributional,
or value-claiming, end of the continuum. 2 The injured plaintiff is in-
terested in maximizing recovery while the defendant (or, more realist-
ically, the defendant's insurer) desires to defeat the claim or at least
to keep the judgment low. Although it has been suggested that some
personal injury plaintiffs have a nondistributional interest in apologies
or other recognition of the harm done, 33 it is generally understood that
the bottom line is the only relevant consideration.-'
At the other end of the spectrum, long term contract cases are usually
seen as exemplifying the potential for a win-win solution. 5 Where the
parties have an interest in their continuing relationship, they may be
willing and eager to compromise short-term distributional advantage in
favor of long-term cooperation.36
Alternatively, cases may be divided not according to the relationship
between the parties, but by the nature of the underlying disagreements
themselves.37 It occurs to me that we might characterize lawsuits as
either simple disputes or principled conflicts. Simple disputes are in the
nature of contests. There is a stake to be divided, or entitlements to
be allocated, but there is no deep, or deeply held, principle to be
vindicated. That is, the parties are in disagreement only over the outcome
of the lawsuit. Thus, examples of simple disputes would include many
31. Id. See also Menkel-Meadow, Legal Negotiation: A Study of Strategies in Search
of a Theory, AM. B. FoUND. RESEARCH J. 905 (1983).
32. Id.
33. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 5, at 783-89.
34. It is occasionally suggested that structured settlements can provide a win-win
alternative in some personal injury cases. Economists will explain, however, that payouts
over time really only vary the ultimate amount of the settlement, making it cheaper for
the defendant and less valuable to the plaintiff. Though a structured settlement may be
more acceptable to the parties, it is still the distribution of a quantifiable sum. McEwen
& Maiman, supra note 8, at 250 (empirical data showing that traffic accident cases have
lowest settlement rate among mediated cases probably due to the different and conflicting
versions of fact, accompanied by hard feelings between the parties).
35. Riskin, supra note 28, at 33.
36. Id.
37. McEwen & Maiman, supra note 8, at 250 (stating that "success rates vary somewhat
according to the nature of the case.").
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warranty complaints,38 many property damage cases,39 and many contract
claims.4 Typically, resolution of the lawsuit can be expected to resolve
the disagreement in a simple dispute.
Disagreements on matters of principle, however, underlie some law-
suits. These can be called "principled conflicts" because the parties are
at issue over something that runs deeper than the outcome of the case.
Employment discrimination, civil rights, public safety, and class action
cases may all provide examples of such conflicts over nonliquid claims.
The parties are interested in the resolution of the matter, but they are
equally, if not more, concerned about validation and vindication. Thus,
the resolution of the lawsuit, particularly by settlement, does not nec-
essarily resolve the conflict.
4
'
Assuming that the above examples can be used to locate endpoints,
there is obviously a range of cases that fall somewhere along the axes
of conflict/dispute and distribution/integration classifications. That uni-
verse is easily represented by the following figure, where the x-axis
represents the type of dispute and the y-axis represents the outcome
potential.
integrative
(y)
simple (x) principled
conflict dispute
distributional
My intuition is that conflicts are less amenable to mediation than
are disputes, and that distributive cases are less mediatable than are
integrative cases. If that is reasonably accurate, then matters with high
positive x and y values will be the best candidates for referral to
mediation. Conversely, cases with low or negative x and y values should
probably remain in ordinary litigation.
38. The failure of a product to function properly, particularly where neither safety
nor injury are involved, would be a simple dispute. Repair, replace, or make compensation
for the defect-whether in an automobile or a supertanker-and the dispute ends.
39. Absent the possibility of recurring harm, monetary compensation for lost or damaged
property would seem to vindicate every plaintiff's interests.
40. Nonperformance, particularly in the case of asserted negligence or inadvertence,
is often a question of fact. Did it happen? Or why did it happen? Once those questions
are resolved the lawsuit is often resolved.
41. See Fiss, supra note 1, at 1075; Terrell, supra note 1, at 545-52.
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My suppositions, of course, have never been validated. Knowledgeable
mediators may have information to the contrary. Moreover, even as-
suming the general accuracy of my characterizations, a system for
assigning weights and values to individual cases remains to be developed.
It seems fairly certain, however, that in most cases a disagreement can
be located on either axis only by consideration of its individual char-
acteristics. To determine the "outcome potential" of any particular case
will require information about the underlying facts and knowledge of
the relationship between the parties.
Why is this relevant to mediation referral? It has been suggested
that mediation is much akin to integrative bargaining, 42 and that the
skills of a mediator are similar to those of a "wise negotiator. ' 43 If that
is truly the case, then judges must be informed that the characteristics
of a case may affect its mediatability. Moreover, and with more difficulty,
it will be necessary to locate a breaking point on some continuum for
the purpose of referral.
IV. MEDIATOR TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION
In contrast to the question of case selection, the Florida workshop
devoted substantial time and energy to the issue of mediator training
and qualification. This, of course, was to be expected, given the centrality
of the individual mediator to the entire process of court annexation. As
I will develop below, the weltanschauung of most attendees seemed
strongly to favor training and to oppose other forms of qualification.
A. Qualification According to the Florida Supreme Court
The Florida code requires the chief judge of each judicial circuit to
"maintain a list of mediators who may be appointed to carry out the
provisions" of the mediation statute." The supreme court is to establish
overall standards for eligibility and qualification.4- In accord with its
statutory responsibility, the Supreme Court of Florida adopted interim
rules on mediator qualifications and training programs that provided
the backdrop for the discussion of the issue at the Florida workshop.46
The supreme court rules divide mediations into three categories and
set separate qualifications for each. To receive referrals from the county
courts, which have limited jurisdiction up to $5,000, a mediator need
42. See generally S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, supra note 28.
43. R. FISHER & W. URY, supra note 30; Hyman, Trial Advocacy and Methods of
Negotiation: Can Good Trial Advocates Be Wise Negotiators?, 34 UCLA L. REv. 863,
897-920 (1987).
44. FLA. STAT. § 44.302(3).
45. Id.
46. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.760 and 1.770.
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only have had twenty hours of certified training and must have engaged
in a variety of specified observations and actual mediations. There are
no other "professional" qualifications.47 In contrast, for the circuit court,
which has unlimited jurisdiction, mediators must be either members of
the Florida bar or retired judges from other jurisdictions, and must
have received forty hours of mediation training. There is, however, no
requirement of mediation experience or observation for circuit court
mediators." Finally, family mediators are restricted to lawyers, psychi-
atrists, certified public accountants, and the holders of masters degrees
in certain fields.49 Additionally, family mediators must have practiced
their underlying professions for at least four years, and, except for those
who hold master's degrees in family mediation, must complete a forty-
hour training program." Again, it is not required that the individual
either have observed or conducted an actual mediation.
5 1
All of this adds up to an interesting pastiche. More serious cases
appear to require greater, or at least more numerous, qualifications, but
only mediators in the smallest cases are required even to have seen-
much less to have participated in or conducted-an actual mediation
prior to certification. Moreover, certified public accountants may mediate
family cases, but not other civil matters involving more than $5,000,
and the same holds true for attorneys from jurisdictions other than
Florida.
The rule places great stock in professional certification. Other than
in very small disputes, mediators must be licensed to practice another
profession. This bias also has implications for the prescribed training
regimen. A separate rule sets out the requirements for the various levels
of certification. County court mediators must receive twenty hours of
training consisting of written and oral communication, mediation theory,
the mediation process, standards of conduct, conflict management, the
court process, and community resources.52 On the other hand, circuit
court mediators (who must all be either practicing lawyers or former
judges), must have forty hours of training, but they are not required
to study either the court process or written and oral communication.1
3
Presumably, the Florida Supreme Court believed that it would be
47. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.760(a).
48. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.760(c).
49. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.760(b)(1). The precise language of the Rule provides that a
mediator of family and dissolution of marriage issues must "have a Masters Degree in
social work, mental health, behavioral or social sciences; or be a physician certified to
practice adult or child psychiatry; or be an attorney or a Certified Public Accountant
licensed to practice in any United States jurisdiction ......
50. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.760(b)(2) and (3).
51. Cf. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.760(a).
52. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.770(c).
53. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.770(a).
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redundant to train lawyers and judges in these matters, but the result
is that circuit court mediators must spend twice as many hours being
trained in fewer subject areas. Finally, family mediators, who must have
forty hours of training, are required to have the same training as county
court mediators, and they are additionally required to cover psychological
issues and family dynamics, the needs of children, family law including
asset evaluation, and family economics. 4 The rule does not suggest what
subjects ought to be deleted from the forty hours in order to make
room for the additional "family" subjects.
Thus, lawyers who wish to mediate family cases must study both the
court process and family law, but no comparable training is necessary
for the largest of civil cases. The law degree suffices; personal injury
lawyers may mediate probate cases and criminal defense lawyers may
mediate securities matters.
It may be that these erratic training provisions will work well in
practice, and it may be that Florida's reliance on law degrees and
professional licensing is justified. Whatever the results, however, the
qualification provisions of the supreme court rules seem almost calculated
to ruffle the feathers of professional mediators. The rules contain no
recognition of mediation as even a nascent profession, and they contain
no provision for the advancement of nonlawyer mediators. Compounded
by the rules' internal inconsistency regarding training, it is no wonder
that even the lawyer-mediators at the Florida workshop devoted con-
siderable time and energy to revisiting the question of qualification.
B. Qualification According to the Mediators
Perhaps in reaction to the Florida Supreme Court Rules, and perhaps
simply as another manifestation of mediator-centrism, the Florida con-
ferees spent what I considered to be an inordinate amount of time
discussing mediator qualifications."s
Predictably, most ire was drawn by the "professional credential"
requirements. A frequently expressed view was that mediation is a skill
that stands completely separate and apart from other professional training
and abilities. Lawyer and nonlawyer mediators alike affirmed that the
ability to bring parties into agreement does not depend on having
54. FLA. R: Civ. P. 1.770(b).
55. The question of who should mediate is frequently raised in mediation literature.
See, e.g., Pipkin & Rifkin, The Social Organization in Alternative Dispute Resolutiorn
Implications for Professionalization of Mediation, 9 JUST. Sys. J. 204, 225 (1984)
(suggesting dividing cases by degrees of complexity; those requiring greater expertise going
to professional mediators, minor disputes going to lay mediators in public agencies); Riskin,
supra note 28, at 29; Rich, The Role of Lawyers: Beyond Advocacy, 1980 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 767; Stulberg, The Theory and Practice of Mediation: A Reply to Professor Susskind,
6 VT. L. REv. 85 (1981).
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completed an academic course of study, and a commonly asserted theme
was that "bus drivers might make the best mediators."56
No person, at least in the discussion groups that I observed, con-
sistently maintained that lawyers or other professionals might have an
advantage in conducting mediations. 7 The nearest that any group ap-
proached such a concession was to allow that judges would be hesitant
to refer cases to nonlawyers. To the observer, it was difficult to determine
how much of this reaction was attributable to "turf" protection, what
portion was based upon the counter-culture of alternative dispute res-
olution, and how much derived from principle. It is imperative, however,
to explore the potential bases for both the supreme court rule and the
mediators' response.
What harm might ensue from limiting court-annexed, mandatory
mediation to professionals? First, good mediators might be excluded.
Second, bad mediators might be engaged. From a systemic perspective,
the first problem is obviously the lesser of the two. Excluding some
good mediators need not be a long-term social harm, so long as other
good mediators take their places. From a societal point of view, then,
individual exclusions would not seem to provide a principled basis for
objecting to the certification requirements.58
To be sure, individual mediators may be aggrieved by the supreme
court's educational requirements. It is no doubt a serious personal harm
for a capable individual to be precluded from or limited in the practice
of mediation. 9 Still, an assessment of the possible justification for such
harm rests upon an evaluation of the substitutes. In this regard we need
to ask, do lawyers make good, bad, or indifferent mediators?6
In this sense, lawyers may be a threat to mediators, or at least to
those who seek to develop an independent profession. Many mediators,
56. See Stulberg, supra note 55, at 94-97 (listing numerous interpersonal qualities and
abilities a mediator should possess); Greason, supra note 7.
57. Cf. Pipkin & Rifkin, supra note 55, at 225 (data from empirical studies indicating
that participants in the ADR movement are substantially professionalized); Stulberg, supra
note 55, at 94 (professional standing is one of the desirable qualities for mediators).
58. Ray Shonholtz, one of the principal speakers at the Florida State workshop, pointed
out that the supreme court's education requirements could have the effect of excluding
minorities from the ranks of mediators. If this assumption is correct, then the certification
requirements will result in systemic harm. To assess the depth of this problem more
questions need to be answered: are there currently (or potentially) significant numbers of
minority mediators? Does the proportion of minorities active in mediation greatly exceed
the proportion of minorities who practice law (or accounting or social work)? Is there a
value to substituting lawyers for nonlawyers that outweighs the need for enhanced minority
participation?
59. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
60. Current mediation literature frequently calls for lawyer involvement in mediation.
The literature suggests that lawyers serve as mediators or at the very least refer their
clients to mediation and serve in an advisory role. See, e.g., Riskin, supra note 28; Rich,
supra note 55; S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, supra note 28.
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however, appear to see the problem more broadly, implying, when not
directly stating, that the involvement of attorneys is bad for the entire
mediation process."
A constant presence at the Florida workshop was what I shall char-
acterize as "The Myth of the Milking Lawyer." This image, almost
Dickensian in its provenance, caricatures lawyers as constantly being
up to no good. Lawyers interfere with mediation. Lawyers only care
about their fees. Lawyers push their clients around. Lawyers only care
about their fees. Lawyers want to control mediation. Lawyers only care
about their fees. Lawyers do not know what is good for their clients.
Lawyers only care about their fees. 2
These views, although not universal, were frequently expressed and
seldom challenged in the various workshop sessions. It was seriously
suggested by one of the "break-up" groups that mediators should be
given the power completely to exclude attorneys from mediations. 3
Another group urged that informing the parties of the right to counsel
ought not be included in mediation guidelines, and that the burden
should be placed on the parties to know that they could be represented
in the proceeding. Neither group addressed the anomaly of diminishing
the role of counsel in a mandatory, court-annexed process. Nor did they
recognize the implications of such rules for institutional or corporate
parties.
There was little discussion of the contributions that counsel might
make either to mediation in particular or to dispute resolution in general."
Rather, the tendency was to regard attorneys as, at best, an impediment
to be overcome. In this vein questions arose such as "How to get lawyers
to allow their clients to mediate?"
The truest believers tended to divide the world between attorneys
and mediators, and to place all virtue on a single side of the divide.
Thus, a common assumption was that mediation, because it may provide
an early resolution, threatens lawyers by diminishing their fees. The
unarticulated result of this attitude is the further assumption that lawyers'
cooperation can only be achieved through stealth or superior power. It
61. See Pipkin & Rifkin, supra note 55, at 222-25 (discussing that involvement of
lawyers and other professionals may greatly increase costs of mediation).
62. See Rich, supra note 55, at 775 (lawyers are criticized for getting carried away
with their advocacy role); Riskin, supra note 28, at 48 n.1 19 (stating that "[m]any lawyers,
if they thought about it, would see mediation as an economic threat.").
63. See 0. J. COOGLER, STRUCTURED MEDIATION IN DIVORCE SETTLEMENT 75 (1978)
(stating that lawyers are not well-equipped to handle problems involving interpersonal
conflict because of their lack of training in the behavioral sciences).
64. Cf. Rich, supra note 55, at 775 (listing several specific reasons why lawyers are
best suited to handle dispute resolution, e.g., complex tax issues); Riskin, supra note 28;
Professional Responsibility Problems of Divorce Mediation, 7 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 4001,
4003 (1981) (asserting that nonlawyer mediators run some risk of engaging in the
unauthorized practice of law).
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fell to me to suggest that the cooperation of the bar might better be
assured through education; that attorneys might willingly embrace me-
diation if the process can be shown to be of benefit to their clients.
All of this speaks primarily to lawyers in their role as advocates.
There was more sympathy for the pre-existing lawyer mediators, perhaps
because those in attendance largely eschewed the practice of law. Still,
if it was accepted grudgingly that lawyers would be involved in mediation
as lawyers, it was hardly accepted at all that they might have an
advantage as mediators. It is not surprising that there was little discussion
of the topic to which I will turn next-the possible special value of
legal education in the process of mediation.
C. The Problem of the "Complex" Civil Case
The single concession that the Florida conferees generally made to
the legal profession was that lawyer-mediators just might be called for
in complex civil cases. The conferees pointedly did not concede that
lawyers would be more able to mediate these matters, but only that
they would have greater credibility with heavily invested litigants. That
is, parties and judges can be expected, albeit mistakenly, to prefer to
entrust mediation to lawyers in the largest and most complicated cases.
The mediators were, by and large, willing to yield on this point in order
to preserve their own credibility, not as a matter of conviction. It
remained an article of faith that any person, properly trained, can
mediate any dispute, and that individual exceptions are subject more
to temperament than to professional background.
I have insufficient experience with the process of mediation to quarrel
with the concept of pan-mediatability. I must express some skepticism,
however, with the position that legal training is irrelevant to the endeavor
of helping parties reach agreement within a judicial context. This last
point was seemingly lost on the conferees: court-annexed mediation is
part of the judicial process, and disputes typically do not reach that
point unless some preliminary efforts at resolution have failed.65 More-
over, the judicial setting brings with it certain rules, conventions, lim-
itations, and requirements which, like it or not, must at least be considered
by the mediator. Thus, the appropriate question is not whether expediency
demands some cession to the legal profession, but rather whether me-
diation of litigated disputes differs sufficiently from other mediations
as to require an attorney in the mediator's seat.
The principal distinguishing features of Florida's mediation scheme,
in addition to court-annexation itself, are (1) mandatory referral, and
65. See Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't
Know (And Think ,We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society,
31 UCLA L. REv. 4, 32-34 (1984).
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(2) enforceability of mediated agreements. As noted earlier, parties may
be compelled to participate in mediation," and failure to comply may
result in sanctions.67 Furthermore, a mediator's "report on agreement" 68
may become "binding upon the parties"69 and apparently enforceable
in the same manner as any other civil judgment. 0 That parties are
acting under compulsion and are potentially subject to severe conse-
quences surely differentiates the Florida program from what might be
termed "purely voluntary" mediation. And while the ability to facilitate
discussion or agreement may be the sine qua non of the successful
voluntary mediator, it is certain that other issues will arise in situations
involving mandatory, enforceable, court-annexed mediation.
Thus, even assuming the internal validity of the theory of universal
mediatability, it is necessary to address the legal issues external to
mediation that arise in the case of judicial referral. What follows is a
partial list of such issues as they arise in civil litigation, with some
emphasis on the value of legal training to their consideration.
First, it would seem that a mediator ought to know exactly what is
at stake in any court referred matter. Such consideration necessarily
extends beyond the parties' conception of the issues, to reach all rea-
sonably foreseeable legal consequences. This concept of looking beyond
the parties' own understanding should be familiar to mediators since it
is analogous to the mediator's search for unrecognized, win-win solutions.
Litigation, however, places limits on, and attaches consequences to, even
mediated outcomes. As a result, even the best nonlawyer mediator could
conceivably facilitate a superficially acceptable agreement that actually
falls short of or thwarts the parties' interests or goals.
Closely related is the problem of completeness or finality. Many cases
involve multiple issues, and generally there is no catalogue available
that sets them out with precision. Often a single issue will predominate,
while numerous sub-issues remain unarticulated or unrecognized. Sig-
nificantly, this likelihood is probably greatest in the "relational" cases,
which many believe are the most suitable for mediation.7 1 Overlooking
sub-issues may frustrate the parties' needs, as noted above, but the more
serious consequence is that their omission may render an agreement
either legally avoidable or ineffective as a matter of law. That is, in
the absence of a comprehensive resolution, the parties may find them-
selves without a truly final agreement. Alternatively, the result may be
that one party is able to walk away from the settlement leaving the
other without recourse.
66. FLA. R. Cv. P. 1.700.
67. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.720(b).
68. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.730(b).
69. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.730(c).
70. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.730(d).
71. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
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This, in turn, raises the question of collateral consequences. An
agreement that is comprehensive, final, and binding, may nonetheless
give rise to harsh, unanticipated consequences. Presumably, a mediator
would want to alert the parties to such consequences, but a nonlawyer
might lack the information to do so.
Finally, we must consider the scope of available relief. Mediators
pride themselves on being able to help fashion flexible agreements that'
do not necessarily take the law's prescriptions into account. This pride.
is appropriate, since often there may be no reason to compel private
parties to conform their agreements to a particular legal rule.72 In this
vein, the law is viewed as a remedy of default, to be applied only as
a second-best alternative where private agreement has failed. Even setting
aside the counterargument that legal rules embody democratically de-
termined limits and norms, it should be apparent that courts cannot be
free to enforce (or even endorse) extra-legal or ultra vires remedies
simply because parties have agreed to them. Law may not bind the
parties, but it surely must bind the court. Thus, court-annexed mediators
must be sensitive both to the legality of the results that they achieve
and the availability of the relief that they fashion.
In abbreviated form, that is the case for using lawyer-mediators in
court-annexed mediation. Lawyer-mediators are more likely to know
what needs to be known in order to assist the parties in reaching an
intelligent agreement. Interestingly, many of the concerns that I have
noted apply to all civil cases, and not only "complex" ones, although
the considerations will obviously multiply as complexity increases.
In reply, it must be said that vigilant counsel, assuming that they
are not excluded by the mediator, and reviewing judges should be able
to correct any errors or omissions made by the mediator. For example,
the Florida Supreme Court Rules provide explicit mechanisms for at-
torney and judicial review.73 The rules specifically require that a judge
review every agreement to "determine whether the terms are lawful,
within the jurisdiction of the court, and, where court approval is required
by law, in the best interests of all parties concerned, including minor
children where appropriate.' 4
Nonetheless, lacunae remain. Even under the Florida Supreme Court
rule the trial judge is not required to examine an agreement for com-
pleteness or for the possibility of collateral consequences. Perhaps counsel
will perform this role, rejecting settlements on the basis of loopholes or
undesirable ramifications. Of course, that would only reinforce the
mediators' charge that attorneys' involvement impedes agreement. More
to the point, clients, especially vulnerable ones, may be unwilling to
72. For arguments to the contrary, see Fiss, supra note 1; Terrell, supra note 1.
73. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.730(b) and (c).
74. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.730(b).
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abandon mediator-approved agreements even where the terms are in-
complete or the results are unforeseeable. We must also allow for the
likelihood that judges and attorneys will rubber-stamp or perfunctorily
review mediated agreements, either out of respect for the mediators or
because of the press of other business.
Finally, where the parties are all represented, let us assume that
judges and counsel will provide sufficient review. In those cases where
the nonlawyer mediator's errors are discovered the entire process will
have been for naught. It does the parties little good to have engaged
in a potentially lengthy and taxing mediation only to discover that the
results must be rejected by counsel or cannot be adopted by the court.
Such a turn of events would be inefficient, time consuming, costly, and
frustrating: the very opposite of the announced goals of the ADR
movement. Certainly that would do nothing to justify the institution of
mandatory, court-annexed mediation.
This is as far as supposition can take us. We are left with the question
with which we began: might lawyers, sometimes or always, be necessary
or desirable as mediators? While I have outlined the circumstances
under which lawyers presumably would be preferred, others could no
doubt point out situations in which a law degree could be detrimental.
The answer to the query is neither self-evident nor inexorable. Unfor-
tunately, the Florida conferees were in the main unwilling even to
address this possibility, and therefore they failed to comprehend these
three truths: first, court-annexed mediation is a special case, and verities
that apply in other contexts must at least be re-examined; second, in a
contest between mediators and lawyers, where the judicial system is the
arena, the lawyers will always win; and, third, when considering dispute
resolution the focus should always be on the parties' needs, never on
the professionals' interests.
V. CONCLUSION
If the purpose of the ADR movement is to de-emphasize conflict
and litigation, and to make a greater reality of citizen-empowered and
cooperative dispute resolution, then the Florida experiment with court-
annexed mediation can only be seen as a victory. For the first time the
civil justice system of an entire state has embraced ADR as a legitimate
and necessary component of civil litigation. As with many popular
movements, however, institutional success is potentially transformative.
Court annexation of mediation may mean abandonment of the ADR
counter-culture, and it certainly requires an end to mediator-centrism.
In a mandatory system the individual mediator can no longer be regarded
as a lone problem-solver, but must come to be seen as a player in a
much larger system. A review of some ADR literature, and the expressed
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views of the Florida conferees, however, combine to suggest that the
ADR movement may not yet be quite ready for that level of success.
